Fraglets represent an execution model for communication protocols that resembles the chemical reactions in living organisms. The strong connection between their way of transforming and reacting and formal rewriting systems makes a fraglet program amenable to automatic verification. Starting from past work where the model has been enriched and executed to specify security protocols and properties (leading to the definition of cryptofraglets), this paper updates cryptofraglets and gives examples of concrete sample analyses over a secure RFID protocol.
INTRODUCTION
Fraglets are computation fragments flowing through a computer network. They implement a chemical reaction model where computations are carried out by having fraglets react with each other. They were originally introduced to automatise the protocol development process, from design, to implementation, and deployment. In the past, main fields of applications have been protocol resilience and genetic programming experiments, see, e.g. [24, 25, 26, 27] .
The close connection between fraglets' basic mechanism of transforming/reacting and formal rewriting systems such as MultiSet Rewriting [2, 23] makes a fraglet program amenable to (automatic) verification. In particular, with an eye to modelling security protocols and verifying security properties, the original pool of fraglets' instructions have been incrementally extended in the past years to deal with symmetric cryptography [23] , access control mechanisms [15] , and dedicated primitives for trust management [16] . This led to the definition of cryptofraglets, i.e., fraglets enriched with capabilities of encrypting, decrypting, signing, and verifying signatures over a series of symbols. Successively, work in [17] showed a more concrete advancement towards adopting fraglets for security modelling and verification, by proposing an executable specification of cryptofraglets in Maude [4, 18] , the popular engine based on rewriting logic [20] .
The current paper extends the work in [17] by 1) enriching the cryptofraglets set of instructions with specific functionalities for hashing and message authentication coding: these functionalities are particularly significant, as they are used as basic building blocks in many protocols; 2) refining the fraglets threat model and the notion of the adversary knowledge (with respect to what proposed in [17] ), i.e., the set of messages an adversary knows between the beginning and end of a protocol run; 3) proposing an extended executable specification of cryptofraglets in Maude. Effectiveness of the enhanced framework is demonstrated by presenting a Maude specification of a privacy preserving RFID identification protocol, RIPP-FS [5, 6] , under the fraglets communication paradigm. The protocol provides a series of features, including: secrecy of the shared key used to authenticate the tag to the reader; tag privacy, intended as un-linkability of two, or more, answers coming from the same tag, against a passive adversary that eavesdrops two (or more) protocol sessions; and forward secrecy, i.e., impossibility for an active adversary that has captured a tag to know which previously eavesdropped answers have been produced by that tag. The specification of RIPP-FS in Maude allows for the automated analysis of such features. We show examples of such analyses, serving as a proof of concept to demonstrate feasibility of modelling and analysing security protocols specified via fraglets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the fraglets model and introduces a refined version of cryptofraglets. Section 3 revises the threat model for cryptofraglets proposed in [17] . Section 4 introduces the executable specification of cryptofraglets in Maude. Section 5 shows a fraglets-based instantiation of one session of the RIPP-FS protocol, highlighting some Maude capabilities to perform automatic analyses on the protocol execution. In Section 6, we briefly revise related work in the area of fraglets and rewrite systems. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
FRAGLETS
A fraglet is denoted as [s1 s2 . . . tail], where si (1  i  n) is a symbol and tail is a (possibly empty) sequence of symbols. Nodes of a communication network may process fraglets as follows. Each node maintains a fraglet store to which incoming fraglets are added. Fraglets may be processed only within a store. The send (mcast) instruction transfers a fraglet from a source store to a destination store (to a set of destination stores).
Fraglets are processed through a simple prefix programming language. Transformation instructions involve a single fraglet, while reaction instructions involve two fraglets. Table 1 shows the fraglets core instructions. The interested reader can find a comprehensive tutorial in [12] . Two fraglets react by instruction match, and their tails are concatenated. With the catalytic matchp, the reaction rule persists.
Instruction nop does nothing, except consuming the instruction tag. Instruction nul destroys a fraglet. Finally, there are a set of transformation rules that perform symbol manipulation, like duplicating a symbol (dup), swapping two tags (exch), copying the tail and prepending different header symbols (fork), popping the head element a out of a list a b tail (pop2), and finally breaking a fraglet into two at the first occurrence of symbol ⇤ (split). Table 2 reports two particular transformation instructions used for enabling communication. In particular, send performs a communication between two fraglets stores. It transfers a fraglet from store SA to store SB . Notation
denotes that the fraglet is located at SA. The name of the destination store is given by the second symbol in the original fraglet [send SB tail]. Where not strictly necessary, we omit this to make the name of the store explicit.
The mcast instruction is newly introduced in this paper to model a multicast communication, namely a communication from a store to a group of other stores, listed in symbol Slist, which represents a list of stores. In case Slist is composed of all possible receivers, mcast acts a broadcast. This instruction is recursively defined, as a fraglet that transforms itself in a simpler one, while generating a new fraglet in one of the destination stores.
The cryptographic version of fraglets, namely the cryptofraglets [23, 15] , extend the fraglets programming language with instructions for encryption and decryption. In this paper, we introduce new instructions for hashing and message authentication coding, and their verification. Table 3 shows the set of cryptographic instructions. Note that, since fraglets processing is through matching tags, the presence of either a reserved instruction tag or of an auxiliary tag as the leftmost symbol is necessary for the computation to proceed.
The encryption instruction takes as input the [enc newtag k1 tail] fraglet, consisting of the reserved instruction tag enc, an auxiliary [19] . The Lamport's scheme is widely used for authentication purposes and to guarantee the property of "forward secrecy" (see Section 5 for an example of application). The hashi fraglet for hash iteration is able to transform itself and evolve to a single hash fraglet, eventually resulting in a fraglet with a tag and a tail sequence as input to a hash function h, when i becomes 0.
The fraglet [hmac t k tail] evolves to compute the hashed-MAC (Message Authentication Code), commonly realized with the combination of a shared key k and a message (the tail sequence). The fraglet transforms itself to a hashed fraglet, with the concatenation of the tail sequence plus the key as input to the hash function h. Operator || denotes concatenation of symbols.
It is worth noting that cryptofraglets instructions abstract from the cryptographic details concerning the operations by which they can be encrypted and decrypted. We make the so called perfect cryptography assumption and we consider encryption as a black box: an encrypted (sequence of) symbol(s) cannot be correctly learnt unless with the right decryption key. Similarly, we consider hash functions to be collision-resistant and non-invertible. This approach is standard in (most of) the analysis of cryptographic communication protocols, see, e.g., [3, 11, 13, 14] .
Finally, for modelling purposes, we define the following simple rules for hash verification, see Table 4 . Basically, instruction hv let a computation proceed with tail2 if two symbols sequences tail1 in two different fraglets with matching tags are equal. In a complementary way, instruction hnv let a computation proceed if two symbols sequences tail1 and tail3 in two different fraglets with matching tags are disequal. The role of these two control instructions will be clarified in Section 5.
The set of fraglets programming instructions in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 consists of rewrite rules [18, 20] , with a simple rewriting semantics in which the left-hand side pattern (to the left of !) is replaced by corresponding instances of the right-hand side one. They represent local transition rules in a possibly distributed, concurrent system. Thus, we assume the presence of a rewrite system (defined by a single step transition operator !, with ! ⇤ as its transitive and reflexive closure) operating on fraglets by means of the rewrite rules corresponding to the fraglets programming instructions. If we let f, f 0 range over fraglets, by applying operations from the rewrite system to a fraglets' set F, a new fraglets' set
As an example of a simple step transition rule application, we have:
Below, we show the initial pool of fraglets, originally at stores SA and SB , needed to execute a simple program that encrypts a fraglet at store A, transfers the cyphertext at store B, and decrypts the cyphertext at store B.
pool of fraglets originally at SA:
pool of fraglets originally at SB :
One possible execution of the program is as follows.
Tags key, msg, and kmsg are auxiliary. In the above example, we assume that SA and SB are the only stores at stake, and that, originally, there are no other fraglets than the ones in the initial pool at A and B.
THREAT MODEL
This section introduces a new threat model for fraglets. We identify nodes A B C, . . . of a communication network as fraglets stores, viz. SA, SB , SC , . . . . Thus, principals of a communication protocol are fraglets stores, within which fraglets (protocol code + protocol messages) are being processed. In particular, communications are via the send ("one to one" communication) and mcast ("one to many" communication) instructions.
We consider a protocol specification involving two, or more, honest roles. In case of two roles, we can call them viz. the initiator SS and the responder SR. Moreover, when modeling and verifying security properties of communication protocols, it is quite common to include an additional intruder whose aim is to subvert the protocol's correct behaviour. A protocol specification is then considered secure w.r.t. a security property if it satisfies this property despite the presence of the intruder. We model the intruder as an untrusted store SX , which can eavesdrop (and possibly modify) the fraglets exchanged between SS and SR (or, more generally, among a set of honest stores).
We do not a priori fix any specific behaviour for the adversary. SX can process fraglets by means of all the instructions presented in Section 2. SX can also honestly engage in a security protocol. To this aim, the pool of fraglets at SX can contain also symmetric keys kSX and kRX , shared with, e.g., SS and SR, respectively. Concerning cryptographic keys, we assume that, at deployment, each store SI contains the pool of keys ⇤ I needed for the store to perform encryptions and decryptions. We also assume that shared secret keys are initially contained only by the legitimate stores that share those keys. Figure 1 shows how a multicast communication is activated among a subset of stores. Each store, within a universe of available stores, process fraglets representing both code and messages to run communication protocols sessions. Instruction mcast at store SA can be programmed to list the subset of stores that will actually receive messages from SA. In particular, solid arrows represent actual communication (i.e., SB and SX receive messages from SA), while dashed arrows represent potential communication (i.e., in principle, communication with SA and SC is possible, but not activated in the figure example). Note that, when specifying security protocols, the adversary store SX is always included in the list of stores of every mcast instruction, to model, at least, eavesdropping.
Apart from some fraglets resident at the stores (denoted, resp., as Adversary's knowledge. The adversary's knowledge [9, 22] is the set of all the messages an adversary knows from the beginning (its initial knowledge) united with the messages it can derive from the ones intercepted during a run of the protocol. In terms of fraglets, the adversary knowledge is the set of all fraglets hosted at SX , at a given state of the computation.
Let FS X be the set of fraglets contained by SX . DEFINITION 1. The intruder's knowledge
is defined as:
for some generic auxiliary or instruction tag ti, i = 0, . . . , m.
Security properties: Secrecy. Secrecy is one of the most common security properties. Intuitively, a message is secret when it is only known by the parties that should share that secret. Thus, in a fraglet context, a symbol (or sequence of symbols) is a secret between SS and SR when it is not possible for SX to know that symbol (sequence). We let F 0 S S and F 0 S R to be the initial, and fixed (according to the protocol in which the honest roles are engaged), set of fraglets stored at, resp., SS and SR, at the beginning of the computation.
is the set of fraglets initially contained by SX . A priori, we do not make any assumption on this set, apart from the fact that it does not contain private information of the honest roles, such as, e.g., shared secret key between SS and SR. DEFINITION 2. The secrecy property Sec(tail)S X of a sequence of symbols tail is preserved if 8F
This means that, for every possible set of fraglets initially contained by the adversary's store, and for every possible union of fraglets' sets contained at SS , SX , and SR that are derivable from the initial sets by applying every possible rule of the rewrite system, SX will never know the secret sequence.
EXECUTABLE FRAGLETS IN MAUDE
Maude is "a programming language that models (distributed) systems and the actions within those systems" [18] . The system is specified by defining algebraic data types axiomatizing system's states, and rewrite rules axiomatizing system's local transitions.
In this section we present our Maude executable specification for (crypto)fraglets. In particular, we define an algebra for them, i.e., the sorts (types for values), and the equationally specifiable operators acting on those sorts (and constants). Also, we define the rewrite laws for describing the transitions that occur within and between the set of operators. Actually, the set of rewrite laws represents the set of (crypto)fraglets instructions given in the tables of Section 2.
The Maude modules consisting of the core cryptofraglets specification are basically three: FRAGLETS, FRAGLETS-RULES, and CRYPTO-FRAGLETS-RULES. Tables 1 and 2 . Below, we highlight excerpts of the rules for the communication instructions of 
---Hashing rl [HASH] : [hash t tail] => [t h(tail)] . ---Iterated (s(i) is successor of i) rl [HASHI] : [hashi t s(i) tail] => [hashi t i h(tail)] . ---Hmac rl [HMAC] : [hmac t tail1 tail2] => [t h(tail1 || tail2)] . ---Hash is not verified crl [HNV] : [ hnv t h(tail1) tail ], [t h(tail2) ] => [tail] if h(tail1) =/= h(tail2) . ... endm
To actually do something with those modules, Maude uses appropriate strategies for rule application. A Maude default strategy is implemented by the rewrite command, that explores one possible sequence of rewrites, starting by a set of rules and an initial state [18] . For example, plugging in "rew [enc t k tail] ." into the Maude environment, we obtain as a result "[t crypt(tail, k)]". The search command is also very convenient. A priori, it gives all the possible sequence of rewrites between an initial and a final state supplied by the user. Practically, since for certain systems the search could not terminate, the command is decorated with an optional bound on the number of desired solutions and on the maximum depth of the search.
In next sections, we show the fraglets specification of a RFID protocol guaranteeing a set of security properties. We will describe properties analysis example in Section 5, through the use of basic strategies. All the analysis examples shown in the paper illustrate how the implementation of fraglets in Maude allows us to exploit the Maude's analysis toolset. In this respect, it is worth noting that in the above analyses we have made use of only basic Maude capabilities. There are several other Maude tools whose use remains to be investigated (e.g., its SAT solver, its reachability analyser and its LTL model checker).
FRAGLET SPECIFICATION OF A RFID PROTOCOL
In this section, we provide a specification of a RFID protocol through cryptofraglets, together with the modelling of some of its provided security properties. We firstly introduce the RIPP-FS [5] protocol, that guarantees RFID tag privacy, mutual authentication and forward secrecy and, then, we provide the protocol fraglets formulation. A subsequent version of the protocol eRIPP-FS [6] was proposed to limit a timing attack to which some hardware implementation could be potentially exposed.
Before introducing the protocol, we briefly recall some security notions. With tag privacy we indicate the property for which a passive attacker cannot distinguish two answers of a same tag, provided that she cannot distinguish between a hmac value and a pseudo random generated number. Mutual authentication is the property through which two entities prove each other their own identity. Forward secrecy ensures that the knowledge of a piece of information does not disclose any information about the past. In the particular case of RIPP-FS, the knowledge of the key of a captured tag does not disclose any information about the previous answers of that tag.
The RIPP-FS protocol
RIPP-FS, introduced in [5, 6] , is a privacy preserving identification protocol for RFID tags: it is able to perform the scanning of multiple tags with only one reading, avoiding the tracking of the tags among subsequent readings. Figure 2 concisely describes the computations and the message exchanges of the protocol.
The main building block of RIPP-FS is the use of a Lamport's scheme to provide the authentication of the reader: each tag stores a value Ai that uses to verify the authenticity of readers' query at time i, since Ai is the result of the iteration of a hash function h over a secret value A0, namely Ai = h i (A0), where h k (·) means the function h iterated k times, h(h(. . . (·)) . . .). In particular, to authenticate a reading, once receiving a new value Aj
send auth A j and time j A j , j
send reply r r if r ⌘ h(k updated ||j) then tag read else tag unknown Figure 2 : The RIPP-FS protocol and a time j (with j > i), the tag must verify that h (Aj) = Ai, where = j i. The collision resistance and the pre-image resistance properties of hash functions guarantee that only the entity that knows A0 could also know the value Aj, since hash functions are one-way and evaluate the pre-image is practically unfeasible.
The same properties are exploited to guarantee the forward secrecy, since the same hash function is used to modify the shared key of a tag, in order to generate a different answer for each reading. In particular, before answering to an authenticated reader, the tag iterates several times the function h over its key, in order to update the key to the current time j. This ensures that if the adversary captures the tag and extracts the key kj, she would be unable to evaluate the previous keys ki, since kj = h (ki), for = j i > 0.
To obtain key secrecy, the updated key is not straightforwardly sent to the reader, but instead it is used by the tag to generate a reply that is a hmac value, namely h(k updated ||j). This ensures that the shared key is never transmitted during the execution of the protocol. Eavesdropping all the communications or sending malicious messages provides no information about the shared key. Finally, if the authentication value Aj does not pass the check h (Aj) ⌘ Ai, then the tag will reply with a pseudo random number of the same length of a hmac value. In this way, any reader that does not know the expected hmac h(k updated ||j) is unable to determine if the reply is a pseudo random number or a legitimate reply.
RIPP-FS fraglet specification
In this section, we introduce a fraglets specification of the RIPP-FS protocol executable in Maude. The reader can be specified as follows: The reader's store contains an initial set of fraglets (protocol messages + protocol code) to perform its steps of the protocol: it can broadcast the authentication value and the time, it can evaluate the expected answer of the tag and verify the actual answer of the tag. It is worth noting the use of the fraglet instruction hashi that 1) produces the authval iterating max-delta times the hash function over the auth0 value and 2) builds the new shared key iterating h over the initial k0tag1 key. In particular, this evaluation originates from the combination with the delta fraglet message that corresponds to the reading number. Finally, we use the two hash verification instructions hv and hnv: only one of them will react with the expmac tag, that is hv if the check is passed, hnv otherwise.
The tag can be specified as follows: The initial fraglets in the tag's store start reacting with the reception of a fraglet with the authl tag. This ignites the reaction of the authentication value check and, then, the broadcast of the answer. It is worth noting that, if the hash verification does not succeed, then the pseudo-random value is sent, since the fraglet with authlast will react with the hnv fraglet. Otherwise, the fraglet reaction will produce the update of the key with the hashi cryptofraglet, the evaluation of the legitimate answer with the hmac cryptofraglet and the broadcast of the hmac value, with the mcast anyone fraglet.
Modelling security properties with fraglets
In this section, we show some security analysis over the fraglets specification of RIPP-FS. We highlight that the examples we depict in the following do not guarantee the fulfilment of the properties under all the possible configurations of the fraglets at stake. For instance, an exhaustive analysis of the protocol would necessitate to explore all the possible initial configurations of the fraglets stores representing the tag, the reader, and the adversary, as well as interactions among the potential universe of other fraglets stores. However, this kind of analysis is out of scope in this paper, whose main purpose is to show how the bio-inspired fraglet paradigm can model protocols as well as security properties.
Key secrecy against passive eavesdropping
To model the key secrecy against a passive eavesdropper, we introduce a malicious reader that eavesdrops on all the communications between a genuine reader and a legitimate tag. It silently exploits the inherently insecure wireless channel to collect the messages exchanged by the honest parties. Her aim is to collect the secret shared key of the tag or any other useful piece of information that would enable its disclosure.
To verify that the key is never disclosed, we leverage the Maude search command that explores all the possible derivatives of a given initial configuration. In particular, to model our adversary, we ask for any final state where the adversary knows the key, as follows: With the above Maude excerpt we are looking for any possible evolution of the model in which the malreader's store contains a fraglet with the key of the tag: t1 and t2 can be any fraglet (even nil or a tag), while more denotes any other possible tag within the store; rest denotes the remaining fraglets of the model that correspond to the stores of tag1 and the genuine reader. The omitted parts denoted with ... are the protocol specification as in section 5. showing that all the possible branches of the model never reached a state in which the key secrecy was violated by the malicious reader.
We remark that the excerpt only describes one possible system configuration: other settings can be explored considering different evolutions of the tag key to be disclosed (for example k0tag1, h(k0tag1) and so on) or different sets of initial fraglets in the malicious reader's store (for example to make the eavesdropped data reacting with other fraglets).
Tag privacy against passive eavesdropping
Similarly to the key secrecy, we check tag privacy with the Maude search command. In particular, we model the prior knowledge of the malicious reader including in its store some hmacs collected during previous exchanges between the genuine reader and two different RFID tags (tag1 and tag2). Moreover, we provide the malreader with a secret key (k), possibly extracted from a third tag. Finally, the malicious reader's store has a set of fraglets that can react with any eavesdropped hmac. We ask Maude to find any evolution of the system in which the cryptofraglet that successfully verifies the hmac reacts within the store of the malicious reader. Thus, we model the tag privacy as follows: With the search command specified as above, Maude will explore all possible evolutions where there the malreader store includes a fraglet with tag 'OK, meaning that the hv tag reacted with the exphmac tag. The outcome is:
No solution. states: 128790 rewrites: 951104 in 15508ms cpu ... meaning that the malicious reader is unable to relate the eavesdropped 'hmac-tag with any of the possible tags.
Note that other possible configurations can consider more fraglets in the malicious reader's store, in order to model a different prior knowledge or more hacking strategies, for example one that tries to disclose the information within the hmac fraglet and to relate them with any of the possible tags.
Forward secrecy against a tag capture
In order to test the forward secrecy property, we simply model the store of the malicious reader. We initialise a configuration where the attacker has eavesdropped some previous successfully acknowledged protocol readings of some tags (tag1 and tag2) and, some time later -eventually after some other readings, she violates the two tags and extracts all the cryptographic material inside them. We ask Maude if the adversary is able to relate any of the collected messages with any of the tags she compromised.
---delta to be checked The fraglets in the store of the malicious reader can combine in many ways, realizing a kind of brute force attack against the collected hmac. This is the outcome of the Maude execution:
No solution. states: 1180 rewrites: 3859 in 56ms cpu ... Again, there was no evolution of the system in which the fraglets in the store were able to produce a 'OK fraglet. This outcome is because of the one-way property of the hash function, since we are assuming that there exists no practical mechanism to have a preimage of a hashed value.
We remind the reader that the complete Maude specification of cryptofraglets, as well as the Maude files of the example analyses shown in the paper, are available at mib.projects.iit.cnr.it/bict14/cryptofraglets. html
RELATED WORK
The BIONETS EU project [1] , BIOlogically inspired NETwork and Services, seeked inspiration from biological systems to provide a fully integrated network and service environment ,able to scale to large amounts of highly heterogeneous devices, and that is able to adapt and evolve in an autonomic way. The fraglets model has been extensively adopted in BIONETS and some security and trust extensions to the original model have become necessary to make it a running framework. That was the main reason why we started reasoning on cryptofraglets, first from a theoretical point of view, then realising a prototypal implementation of cryptofraglets in Maude to run some example analyses.
In the literature, there exist remarkable examples of the use of rewriting systems for modelling security protocols and analysing their properties, including, e.g., [21, 8, 10] . Work in [21] shows how the Dolev-Yao model [7] of security protocol analysis may be-formalized using a notation based on multi-set rewriting with existential quantification and exemplifies the formalisation of subtle security properties. Under the same context, in [8] the authors analyze the complexity of the secrecy problem under various restrictions, showing that, even with a restricted size of messages, the secrecy problem is undecidable for the case of an unrestricted number of protocol roles and an unbounded number of freshly generated messages (so called nonces). The open complexity problem is indeed the main issue that one needs to explore for better defining limits and advantages in adopting cryptofraglets for security analysis. Indeed, as pointed out in the above sections, the example analyses that we have shown consider a limited number of actors and no generation of fresh messages. Finally, for page limits, we refer the interested reader to the tutorial in [10] , describing the Maude-NRL Protocol Analyzer, a Maude-based tool for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. The tutorial also points to related work in the area of security protocols models and analysis, with an eye to rewriting systems.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we renewed the cryptofraglets definition, enriching it with instructions for multicasting, hashing, and message authentication coding. Based on this new communication model, we also present a refined threat model where fraglets stores can engage in communication protocols together with either no intruder, or a passive intruder, or an active one. The executable specification of cryptofraglets in Maude has been refreshed too and modelling of properties as forward secrecy and tag privacy (intended as unlinkability of two, or more, answers coming from the same tag) has been presented as a proof of concept that paves the way for further investigation. As an example, we aim at extending the current work to deal with more general scenarios, where, e.g., the initial set of fraglets in the adversary store is not a priori fixed and considering more actors in a protocol run. Regarding the verification formal tool, we have exploited only a minimal set of the Maude capabilities, while in the future we intend to move to more sophisticated analysis tools among the Maude toolkit.
